In early February 2026, President Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced a trade agreement that trades low US tariffs with India’s commitment to shift part of its imports to US and Venezuelan barrels. After last summer’s trades and deadline slips, the news came as a relief to Washington. Many people had started to wonder if this plan would continue.
The announcement also shows how this partnership works in real life. Two large democracies with excessive security requirements, no defense treaty, and a practice of negotiation in full view. George E. Bogdena senior executive at the Yorktown Institute and a consultant at Continental Strategy, he describes relationships managed through constant dialogue and daily problem solving, not neat scorecards that settle disputes on paper.
That rhythm stems from India’s long-standing penchant for “strategic autonomy,” now often described as multiple alignments. New Delhi has resisted formal alliances since independence, maintaining a working environment with Washington, Moscow, Gulf producers, and allies across Asia. Strategic independence does not preclude a deeper relationship with the United States in defense, technology, and trade. It produced a different model. Cooperation is real, and so is India’s insistence on keeping its vote.
China is the reason these two topics keep coming back to each other. India’s geography places it on the sea lanes connecting the Persian Gulf with East Asia, and the navy has been expanding its role in the Indian Ocean. For Washington, India is a rare partner with the size and position to help contain China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific without requiring a treaty signature.
Economics adds weight. India sits at the top of the global economy, and its domestic market continues to attract investment even as global growth slows. For US companies trying to reduce exposure to China, India offers few scales that others can match.
Security bonds now look less like a catalog purchase and more like an industrial project. I GE F-414 jet engine dealwith a large transfer of technology to Indian manufacturers, it points to co-production as the main objective. The planned purchase of MQ-9B drones and the launch of the Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance point in the same direction. The goal is collaborative power and shared power, not just delivery.
Human links are equally difficult to untangle. Hundreds of thousands of Indian students attend US universities each year, and the estimated 4.5 million Indian-American community occupies influential roles across business, science, and politics. That region maintains pressure on both governments to step in when services are disrupted.
Sticking points are permanent, and structural. India avoids being a treaty partner, and that obligation is most clearly reflected in its Russia policy. New Delhi continues to buy Russian arms and depends on Russian oil that has been cut at a time when Washington is trying to squeeze the Kremlin’s finances. In December 2025, India and Russia signed the RELOS agreement, a reminder that India is keeping options open even during US cooperation.
Trade has been another pressure. Trump’s first move to impose a 50 percent tariff on Indian goods showed genuine frustration with market access restrictions. It also rattled companies on both sides and threatened security cooperation. Negotiations later ended tariffs at about 18 percent—still high by recent standards, but low enough for both governments to seek progress.
Bogden calls this approach “economic distortions,” using access to the US market as leverage for effects that reach beyond trade margins. “United States power is an important tool—a nonviolent tool of foreign policy that can achieve many important goals,” he said. “Not just good trade relations, but good political results that are often not connected to trade.”
Regional politics add to the tension. Washington’s public claim that it helped broker an end to the 2025 India-Pakistan war, a claim rejected by New Delhi, left scars. The US resettlement with Pakistan is reviving old worries in India about America’s staying power.
The February 2026 agreement shows how both sides are handling this conflict. Tax exemptions went off the table, power purchases changed, and each side got something measurable. Commercial terms and strategic objectives did not differ.
Bogden argued that tariff threats behave differently than sanctions. They are comprehensive, time-bound, and reversible. They create urgency and generate deals. His explanation of its sequence is unclear. Set yourself a deadline, invite agreements, trade pressure for obligations.
Linking prices to oil purchases also served Russia’s goal. A decrease in the Russian crude in India import mix means less money flowing into Moscow. India got various tax breaks and provisions. Washington gained power without asking India to sign on to a regime of discipline that it did not want.
The upcoming rounds of negotiations will likely look similar. The Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology, launched under the Biden administration, has been rebranded as TRUST—Transforming Relationships Using Strategic Technology. The agenda is built around deliverables. It includes an AI infrastructure roadmap, key minerals cooperation, and supply chains designed to reduce dependence on China.
India’s rare earth deposits in Odisha and Kerala have generated a lot of interest. The United States is looking for ways to use Chinese-owned chains. India wants investment, technology, and a bigger role in high-value manufacturing. Future packages are likely to pair the transfer of US technology—jet engines, drones, semiconductors—with direct Indian access to market access, export controls, and standards.
None of this gets rid of the annoying stuff. Trade deficits will arise again. Human rights disputes will arise. India will continue to guard its independence, including relations with Russian and Gulf producers. The relationship will require constant attention and a high tolerance for public discussion.
The good news is that disputes are usually about words, not about the direction of the partnership. The United States and India face a shared set of competitors and risks, with China at the center. That makes it easier to prioritize cooperation in defense, maritime security, and technology, even if the trade dispute lingers in the background.
Calling India a rising power is not missing the time. India has taken a step forward. Washington will get more out of the partnership by treating India as a major power with its own red lines—and by making deals that respect them.
